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Gondwana’s Promises. German Geologists in Antarctica 
between Basic Science and Resource Exploration  
in the Late 1970s 
Christian Kehrt ∗ 
Abstract: »Gondwanas Versprechen: Deutsche Geologen in der Antarktis zwi-
schen Grundlagenforschung und Rohstoffsuche in den späten 1970er Jahren«. 
The 1970s was a crucial period of transition in polar science, when Antarctica, 
as the “continent defined by and for science” (Elzinga 1993), was intrinsically 
linked with economic interests and global environmental concerns. This shift 
towards a resource-oriented research agenda will be examined in the case of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and its GANOVEX (German Antarctic North 
Victoria Land Expedition) Expeditions. They started in 1979 and aimed to erase 
the last blank spots on the geological map of Antarctica and thus prove that 
Germany can attain consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). In 
this context, scientists played a key role in negotiating the possibilities and lim-
its of resource exploration in the late 1970s. I will discuss the so-called “Gond-
wana hypothesis” and its role in resource-driven research and argue that global 
geopolitical interests in new resource potentials motivated the geological map-
ping of Antarctica. 
Keywords: Cold War history, environmental history, Antarctic Treaty System, 
earth governance, global environment. 
1.  Introduction1 
Hope in natural resources has always been exaggerated by scientists  
as a bait for politicians to sponsor expeditions. Krill and Antarctic fish  
in the mid-1970s when fishing yields and fishing rights faded away for  
distant water fleet; oil and gas after the first oil shock in 1973 and  
the early Antarctic indications of gas by Glomar Challenger.  
Theory of plate tectonics of Gondwana supported hope for 
 valuable minerals on the Antarctic continent.  
(Hempel 1984, 136) 
                                                             
∗  Christian Kehrt, Lehrstuhl für Neuere Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Technikgeschichte, Helmut 
Schmidt University, University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Holstenhofweg 85, 
22043 Hamburg, Germany;  
kehrt@hsu-hh.de. 
1 This paper is part of an ongoing habilitation project on German polar science in the Cold 
War. I thank Franz Tessensohn for the interview and helpful remarks. 
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In the 1970s, the US research vessel Glomar Challenger was not only drilling 
for salt domes in the world oceans indicating oil occurrences. It also provided 
evidence for the revolutionary, global earth science theory of plate tectonics. In 
this context, the geological formation of Antarctica as the former heart of the 
“Gondwanaland” supercontinent was also of interest for resource-driven re-
search. In 1975, the US estimated that there were 7.5 billion tons of oil and 3.2 
billion Nm3 of gas in and around Antarctica (BArch 102/184068, 23/07/1975, 
1). At that time the basic scientific motivation to systematically investigate the 
formation of continents and map the earth’s geological structure was pushed by 
the assumption that huge reserves of mineral resources were to be expected. 
While geophysical research blossomed in the early Cold War, geological in-
vestigations in Antarctica increased only in the aftermath of the International 
Geophysical Year 1957/58 (IGY), when modern logistics facilitated geological 
field trips and geological data on Antarctica increased (Ford 2006, 4). One 
plausible explanation was the political motivation to avoid territorial conflicts 
that are directly linked to practices of mapping and geological exploration. In 
the 1970s, the “limits of growth” and the so-called “oil shock” were motivating 
new strategies for resource exploration. Countries like Germany (1979), with 
only small natural reserves of metals and oil, and soon afterwards India (1983) 
and China (1983), increased their engagement in polar science for geopolitical 
reasons.2 This shift towards a more resource-oriented research agenda will be 
examined in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany. In this context, the 
so-called GANOVEX (German Antarctic North Victoria Land Expedition) 
Expeditions will be considered. They started in 1979 and aimed to erase the last 
blank spots on the geological map of Antarctica and thus prove that Germany 
can attain consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty System. Bearing in mind 
that crisis and conflicts in resource consumption are of particular interest for 
environmental historians, this period is of importance for environmental history 
as well as for contemporary history, which recently focused intensively on this 
period “after the boom” (Uekötter 2007; Jarausch 2008; Doering-Manteuffel 
2008; Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael 2010). 
In the following I will look closely at the conflicting interests related to en-
vironmental protection and mineral resources in Antarctica and ask what role 
scientists played in negotiating the possibilities and limits of resource explora-
tion in the late 1970s. I will argue that geopolitical considerations of new re-
source potentials motivated the geological mapping of Antarctica. The case of 
German efforts to become a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty Sys-
tem confirms Aant Elzinga’s claim that “science became the vehicle through 
                                                             
2 Germany is one of the biggest consumers of resources worldwide. While large parts of 
nonmetal-mineral resources such as earth and stones, potash and brown coal can be cov-
ered from its own reservoirs, Germany depends heavily on the import and world market 
conditions of primary metal resources, oil, gas and stone coal (BGR 2012, 13). 
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which geopolitical rivalry and the quest for an Antarctic influence was chan-
neled” (Elzinga 1993, 85). 
Recently the Polar Regions have gained new attention in the history of sci-
ence. In particular, the role of the Arctic during the Cold War has been investi-
gated (Weiss 2001; Petersen 2008, 2011; Farish 2010; Korsmo 2010; Heymann 
et al. 2011; Martin-Nielsen, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Kehrt 2013). Yet major works 
on the Polar Regions are US centered. There is a lack of studies on European 
countries (Roberts 2011), the Soviet Union (Gestwa 2011; Josephson 2011, 
2014) and non-Western countries like South Africa, India, China (Wang 2010) 
and Argentina, for example (Howkins 2008). The role of East and West Ger-
man polar expeditions in the period after 1945, especially in the crucial period 
of the 1980s, when there were new conflicts and dynamics within the expand-
ing Antarctic Treaty System, is almost unknown, although West Germany 
became a major player in Antarctic scientific expeditions in the 1980s (Abbink 
2009; Fleischmann 2005).3 The geopolitical dimension of Antarctic science and 
the dominant role of politics and scientific internationalism are common 
themes in the historiography of Antarctic science (Elzinga 1993; Dodds 1997, 
2010; Belanger 2006; Turchetti et al. 2008; Howkins 2008; Launius, Fleming 
and De Vorkin 2010; Barr and Lüdecke 2010; Roberts 2011). But questions of 
Antarctic resources and geological expeditions so far have seldom been dealt 
with by historians. Only Fogg explicitly takes into account the decisive role of 
British geologists in the period from the heroic phase of Antarctic exploration 
to the IGY; but he does not consider political interests in resources (Fogg 1992, 
245-68). While geological expeditions in Greenland are researched (Ries 
2012a, 2012b; Nielsen and Knudsen 2013), when and how resource-driven 
motives shaped Antarctic science in the period after the IGY remains an open 
question (Roberts 2011,147; Belanger 2006, 280; Howkins 2008, 32). 
2.  Antarctica as a Continent Defined by and for Science? 
Antarctica has peculiar physical features: it encompasses about 14 million 
square kilometers and is almost totally covered by a 3-kilometer-thick ice 
sheet. It is an ice desert with few traces of life that looks more like extraterres-
trial planets, while the surrounding oceans with their peculiar ecosystems are 
rich and diverse. Antarctic mineral resources are assumed to exist offshore in 
the continental shelves as well as underneath the gigantic ice sheet. Due to its 
ice masses, Antarctica is a global heat sink that influences weather patterns and 
ocean currents on a global scale. Most of its mountain ranges, ridges and land 
                                                             
3 Only Benjamin Peter Abbink’s policy-oriented study on Antarctica has compared Germany 
with the Netherlands and Belgium. Unfortunately, the well-written and informative book by 
Klaus Fleischmann lacks references to sources and literature. 
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are covered by ice. Only three to five percent of its geological structures are 
accessible and until the International Geophysical Year 1957/58 large parts 
were still unknown. In fact, this remote continent is extremely difficult to ac-
cess. To get there requires modern logistics, airplanes or icebreaking ships and 
modern means of telecommunication and techniques such as remote sensing, as 
well as sheltered living units for overwintering parties. Since Antarctic expedi-
tions are costly, the state and politics play important roles, and thus, only when 
there is interest from the political arena does Antarctic research become possible.  
Science is the essential precondition for accessing Antarctica. Countries 
have to establish a permanent research station and massively invest in polar 
science if they want to participate in the Antarctic Treaty System meetings and 
negotiations. Nowadays hundreds, and in summer thousands, of scientists live 
there to conduct all kinds of different forms of research from astrophysics, 
meteorology and glaciology to geology, biology and even archaeology. It is a 
place to pursue general scientific questions or get more knowledge about the 
peculiar nature of Antarctica and the extremely interesting interactions between 
the lithosphere, biosphere and atmosphere. Antarctica is regulated by the Ant-
arctic Treaty System established in 1961. The exclusive club of the Antarctic 
Treaty System was created by 12 mostly industrial nations in the aftermath of 
the International Geophysical Year 1957/58.  
In Antarctica, global issues such as atomic warfare and Cold War conflicts, 
limits of growth and resource exploitation, the fragility of nature, environmen-
tal pollution and climate change are negotiated, mirrored and projected. I un-
derstand Antarctica as a socially constructed global knowledge space, where 
different actors try to realize their geostrategic goals. The last blank spot on the 
map of the earth was perceived as a space of opportunities that fueled the imag-
ination of politicians and the general public and allowed scientists to pursue 
new research. Questions of place and space play a crucial role in global history 
as well as in the history of science (Livingstone 1995, 2003; Naylor and Ryan 
2010; Busche 2010; Rheinberger, Wahrig and Hagner 1996; Renn 2012). Dorit 
Müller understands Antarctica as a knowledge space (“Wissensraum”) that is 
construed through modern media, scientific practices and public images and 
representations (Müller 2012).  
In the following I will locate the German case in the changing agenda of the 
Antarctic Treaty System in the 1970s and 1980s. The emerging tensions be-
tween new environmental concerns and the possibilities of future mineral ex-
ploration in Antarctica are analyzed. In this context the Gondwana hypothesis 
played a crucial role. Plate tectonics not only revolutionized geology and put 
Antarctica in the middle of global tectonic theories, it was also of political and 
economic value, since it gave a plausible explanation for assuming huge miner-
al resource potential in Antarctica. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  206 
3.  The Gondwana Hypothesis and the Hope for Mineral 
Resources 
Antarctica was at the heart of the so-called “Gondwanaland” that formed the 
former supercontinent including Africa, Australia, India and South America 
and parts of present North America and Europe (Pyne 1998, 216; Estrada, 
Damaske and Läufer 2009, 32). It originated in Precambrian time from frag-
ments of Rondinia, approximately 550 million years ago in a period of “high 
crustal mobility in the region of the continents of the present southern hemi-
sphere. This occurred because of the rapid generation of new oceanic crust and 
its subsequent subduction” (Frisch, Meschede and Blakeley 2011, 160). Gond-
wana, according to our present knowledge, broke up in the early Jurassic peri-
od, 180 million years ago. Many basic questions of the earth sciences relating 
to the origins of continents and global tectonics were and still are related to the 
complex puzzle of how Antarctica fits into the changing patterns and assump-
tions of earth history. The idea of a former supercontinent was formulated by 
the Austrian Eduard Suess (1831-1914) in the late nineteenth century in his 
four-volume Das Antlitz der Erde.4 In this grand synthesis he tried to explain 
the basic mechanisms of mountain formation and the relation between conti-
nents and oceans in earth history that were debated during the nineteenth centu-
ry. But his idea of contraction as the main mechanism of a dynamic and chang-
ing earth based on a cooling of the earth’s interior that then causes a crumbling 
and shrinking of its crust was soon criticized (Greene 1982, 259; LeGrand 
1988, 27; Oreskes 1999, 21). Suess never fully gained recognition in the USA 
and his contraction theory lacked geophysical evidence. As Mott Greene’s 
careful historical interpretation of geology in the nineteenth century has clearly 
shown, there was no consensus and geology was a pluralistic and conflicting 
landscape of different approaches, methods and viewpoints: 
Geology in 1912 was as fragmented, from a theoretical point of view, as at 
any time since its eighteenth-century beginnings. Geology, while a mature 
science, functioned without a universally accepted theoretical framework for 
decades thereafter […]. The competition of these hypotheses through the next 
fifty years (1920-1970) has only recently abated, and with the general ac-
ceptance of the theory of plate tectonics, geology enjoys a degree of unifica-
tion it has not experienced since the latter part of the nineteenth century 
(Greene 1982, 290). 
In 1912, when Wegener formulated for the first time his new idea of continen-
tal drift, there was a bewildering and often contradicting pluralism of ap-
                                                             
4 The name “Gondwana” (land of the Gonds, a tribe living in northern India), and the related 
faunal evidence of Glossopteris, was already used by British scientists such as Henry Bene-
dict Medlicott, Ottokar Feistmantel and William T. Blanford, before Suess widely popularized 
it (Thenius 1981, 54; Glaubrecht 2012, 293). 
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proaches. Wegener aimed to solve these fundamental differences by elaborat-
ing a new global tectonic theory. Like Suess, he professed the idea of a former 
supercontinent and based his thoughts on geological and paleontological evi-
dence. Both looked for structural similarities and comparable patterns of flora 
and fauna across continents to find evidence for a former united landmass. But 
in contrast to Suess, Wegener did not use the concept of a cooling and contract-
ing earth, which was contrary to the new knowledge of heat production through 
radioactivity; instead he preferred to adopt the revolutionary idea of a horizon-
tal movement. Wegener’s supercontinent did not in the course of events sink 
into the Southern Ocean. Instead he chose the idea of a breaking up and drifting 
apart of Gondwanaland (Oreskes 1999, 55; Wegener 1929; Krause, Schönhart-
ing and Thiede 2005). But Wegener’s idea of continental drift was only one of 
many not fully convincing attempts to solve basic theoretical questions that for 
more practice-oriented American field geologists were not of prime importance 
(LeGrand 1988, 19; Oreskes 1999; Glaubrecht 2012, 342). 
In Our Wandering Continents (1937), the South African field geologist Al-
exander du Toit (1878-1948) also tried to argue in favor of continental drift 
theory on the basis of his extensive work on the formation of the South African 
geological Karoo system, which shows similarities to structures in South 
America and Australia (LeGrand 1988, 82; Oreskes 1999, 292). He continued 
to elaborate Wegener’s ideas, tried to provide further evidence for continental 
drift, and instead of Wegener’s Pangea proposed a northern (Laurasia) and 
southern (Gondwana) supercontinent. But du Toit’s theory and evidence were 
still criticized by American scientists. Only with new geophysical evidence 
from submarine investigations of the ocean floor in the Cold War could the 
already established elements and mechanisms of continental drifts be turned 
into a new global theory of plate tectonics (Oreskes and LeGrand 2003). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Antarctica attracted geologists for several 
reasons. First, the revolutionary theory of plate tectonics put Antarctica in the 
middle of the former supercontinent called “Gondwanaland” and promised new 
biogeographic insights into earth history in relation to the surrounding conti-
nents, as well as Antarctica’s own geological formation, which for a long time 
was not well understood due to the lack of systematic geological knowledge of 
Antarctica. Up to the International Geophysical Year in 1957/58 there were no 
systematic seismic soundings of Antarctica land structures and the questions of 
whether it forms a united continental landmass or whether East and West Ant-
arctica are separate and based on different geological structures (continental 
plate versus archipelago) were unsolved. 
The new theory of plate tectonics helped to systematically explain larger 
tectonic formations and structures beyond individual findings and to get new 
and deep insights into earth history. In the early seventies, plate tectonics be-
came the new framework for Antarctic geology (Craddock 1970; Fogg 1992, 
260). In 1970, the International Symposium on Antarctic Earth Science of the 
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Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) dedicated a whole session 
to “Antarctica and Continental Drift”; its successor in Madison in 1977 no 
longer needed to explicitly address this already accepted theory (Ford 2006, 6). 
Nevertheless, the leading German Antarctic geologist, Franz Tessensohn, em-
phasized that there were still differences between northern and southern hemi-
sphere geologists.5 In 1981, he handed in a paper trying to explain mountain 
formations with a pre-plate tectonics geosynclinal approach.6 
New techniques of accessing and working in this difficult environment 
made systematic geological research by helicopters, airplanes and ships possi-
ble7 – even though within a comparably limited area: “Although Antarctica has 
a coast about three times as long as that of the USA, its total length of ice-free 
shoreline is probably less than that between Washington and Boston” (Hold-
gate and Tinker 1979, 6). But the main reason to systematically investigate the 
geological structure of Antarctica was new geopolitical concerns related to global 
living and nonliving resources:  
Although no petroleum resources are known in Antarctica and the petroleum 
industry is not particularly interested at present, economic and political con-
siderations may change the industry’s interest in the next few years, and ex-
ploration and exploitation are possible within one or two decades (Behrendt 
1983, 22). 
The assumption that in Antarctica mineral reserves similar to other continents 
could be expected was supported by the so-called Gondwana hypothesis 
(Wright 1977). 
The starting point was analogous reasoning, which left a lot of space for 
speculation. If the former parts of Gondwanaland, like South America, Austral-
ia and South Africa, showed structural similarities with Antarctica, the proba-
bility that there would be similar mineral occurrences was assumed to be rather 
high. “Because the Antarctic is a continent like all the others, it means that it 
contains similar rock and mineral types as the others. We must treat the un-
known ice-covered Antarctic continent in analogy to its better known neigh-
bors” (Tessensohn 1984, 189). This reasoning stood at the beginning of an 
increased interest in Antarctica as a resource treasury for the industrial nations, 
which up to this point had dominated the rather exclusive club of the Antarctic 
Treaty System. In a first overview for the US Geodetic Survey, Nancy Wright 
                                                             
5 Interview with Franz Tessensohn, 19/12/2012. 
6 It was turned down by the publishers because there was no use of plate tectonics. The 
concept of geosynclines goes back to the nineteenth century, especially James Dwight Da-
na’s Contraction Theory from 1872. In its different variants it tries to explain mountain 
building by processes of sedimentation of ocean troughs that are then lifted upwards and 
fold into mountains (Frisch, Meschede & Blakeley 2011, 1). This approach remained the 
leading explanation for mountain building until the new theory of plate tectonics.  
7 The second German North Victory Land Expedition in 1982, for example, completely failed 
because the ship was sunk suddenly by moving ice plates. 
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summarized the Gondwana hypothesis in 1975 and used it to discuss Antarcti-
ca’s mineral potentials (Wright and Williams 1974, 18). But the arguments and 
findings of geologists left a lot of room for different and rather flexible inter-
pretations. So while theoretically it was assumed that “(l)arge accumulations of 
minerals very probably occur in Antarctica, for no other continent is void of 
mineral deposits” (Wright and Williams 1974, 3), in practice there was no clear 
evidence that minerals of economic value had already been found in large 
quantities or would be found in the near future: “Antarctica now has no known 
economically recoverable resources of any category, nor does Antarctica have 
any known mineral districts” (Wright and Williams 1974, 2). 
Figure 1: Mineral Deposits in Gondwanaland 
 
Source: Craddock 1990, 4. 
 
This indeterminate, open situation put scientists in a “challenging” position, 
because they could push their basic geological research by opening up the 
prospect of future mineral exploitation in Antarctica. At the same time they had 
to maintain their scientific ideals and criteria by pointing to the meager evi-
dence and counterarguments, trying to differentiate between mineral occur-
rences and mineral reserves, scientific facts and economic and technological 
feasibility. Thus they opened the possibility of future exploitation without fully 
supporting it, nor totally rejecting it: “but the probability that mineral deposits 
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exist in Antarctica seems to be high. The crucial factor, however, is whether 
they can be found” (Wright and Williams 1974, 1). 
Looking more concretely at the available geological evidence, gray reports 
concluded that so far no significant mineral deposits had been found (Wright 
and Williams 1974; Craddock 1970; CIA 1978; Behrendt 1983). The most 
likely event that eventually could also be economically feasible would be oil 
discoveries, but all other possible mineral occurrences, like coal and copper 
deposits, would be too expensive to be exploited commercially. These consid-
erations took place without any actual indication of oil and were thus rather 
hypothetical.8 Obviously, the thirst for oil and the need to look for long-term 
alternative resource potentials were high at the time. So even rather hypothet-
ical accounts or extremely difficult, costly and environmentally problematic 
options for future oil exploitation triggered the attention of politics and secret 
services. In newspapers, magazines and gray reports, vague figures and over-
rated expectations circulated. Once these figures were out, scientists had diffi-
culties in limiting and correcting them: 
In the last couple of months Antarctica has moved increasingly into the focus 
of the German public eye. News of immense resource estimations went 
through the press. Occurrences of oil and natural gas with reserves ‘greater 
than in Alaska’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13.02.1978) or of 45 billion barrels of 
oil and 410 billion cubic meters of gas (Spiegel, 20.02.1978) were mentioned 
besides a long list of mineral resources, ‘chrome, nickel, manganese, calcium 
fluoride, copper, diamonds, molybdenum, iron, uranium and coal’ (Stern 
11/78). Is this news really true? (Tessensohn 1979, 248). 
A CIA report, for example, mentioned 900 possible mineral occurrences in 
Antarctica, but only 20 of these were accessible (CIA 1978, 14). Published 
maps in newspapers did not distinguish between “mineral occurrences” and 
“mineral reserves” or “mineral deposits,” so the map of Antarctica indicating 
minerals was misleading.9 In fact, there was still no real evidence for major 
mineral reserves and thus the whole undertaking stood on shaky ground. Be-
yond that, not every geological fact could be easily fitted with the Gondwana 
hypothesis and the puzzling movement of continents in geological time frames. 
The age of the rocks and sediments found in Antarctica did not always corre-
spond with the Gondwana breakup: “One can use the Gondwana hypothesis 
only partly for the hydrocarbon prediction on the continental shelves, because 
most of the basins are younger than this event” (Tessensohn 1984, 199). Also, 
the so-called “ring of oil,” indicating the global location of supergiant oilfields, 
suggested that in the former Gondwanaland countries there would be no super-
                                                             
8 Only in 1985 did the German ship Polarstern, drilling in the South Polar Sea, find indica-
tions of oil, a typical oily smell. 
9 Mineral reserves are defined by their economic value and availability in contrast to mineral 
resources, which are defined by their natural properties, location and concentration, but 
give no indication about costs, accessibility and possibilities of exploration. 
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giant oilfields (Behrendt 1983, 3).10 Nevertheless, the Gondwana hypothesis 
was generally accepted in the aftermath of the plate tectonics revolution and 
thus could be used to stimulate political interest in future mineral reserves in 
Antarctica. It was vague enough to argue for more geological research, but 
widely accepted by the scientific community, so there was a common ground 
and trading zone for scientists and politicians. The chances of commercial 
exploitation of mineral resources on the landside of Antarctica were considered 
to be rather small in the near future because of the difficulties in accessing 
them and drilling through the several-kilometer-thick ice sheet. However, the 
findings of Glomar Challenger and other drilling ships supported the assess-
ment to find and exploit offshore oil and gas reserves in the Antarctic continen-
tal shelf. This, however, stood in direct opposition to the concrete interests of 
harvesting living resources in the waters surrounding Antarctica – a fragile 
ecosystem that recovers very slowly from oil pollution. 
4.  West Germany’s Antarctic Politics 
While the German Democratic Republic participated continuously in Soviet 
Antarctic expeditions from the 1960s on (Fritzsche 2011), West Germany was 
a late starter in Antarctic exploration, due to the long-term effects of the Sec-
ond World War, which caused a major break and disturbance in the earth sci-
ences. In the 1970s, the state became interested exactly at a time when a new 
agenda for Antarctic research was under way. A major reason for Germany’s 
new Antarctic strategy was its difficult position in the United Nations Law of 
the Sea Convention, which nationalized the offshore zones up to 200 km and 
excluded Germany, with its rather short coastline, from important fishing 
grounds in the Northern Atlantic. Therefore the prospect of gaining access to 
major living and nonliving resources motivated the massive engagement in 
Antarctica in the late 1970s culminating in the foundation of the German Polar 
Science Institute in Bremerhaven and a long-term membership with consulta-
tive status (Abbink 2009; Fleischmann 2005). 
The most important West German actor in resource-oriented geological po-
lar science was the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Resources (ger. 
“Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe,” BGR) in Hannover, 
financed by the Ministry of Economics and responsible for the exploration of 
Antarctica’s mineral potential.11 In 1975, the BGR stated in a letter to the Min-
                                                             
10 But this was rather a generalization of actual findings and not a sound geological theory. 
11 The Federal Institute for Fisheries Research (Bundesforschungsanstalt für Fischerei, Ham-
burg), financed by the Ministry for Agriculture, Forests and Food (Ministerium für Land-
wirtschaft, Forsten und Ernährung), was responsible for the investigation of living resources 
in Antarctic waters. 
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ister of Science and Technology that a basic interest in Antarctic hydrocarbons 
existed because there were no major oil reserves in West Germany (BArch 
102/184068, 23/07/1975, 1). From the perspective of a secret service study, this 
was a “hidden fight” (“verdeckter Kampf”), a geostrategically motivated dip-
lomatic effort related to the geopolitical space (“Großraum”) of Antarctica 
under the guise and with the help of science (BArch 102/184069, 15/06/1976, 
22). This politically motivated strategy, which took science as a place holder 
for geopolitics, was also articulated in a letter to the secretary of state at the 
Ministry of Economics, Carsten Rohwedder, with regard to the consultative 
membership: “Vis-à-vis third countries only a general German research interest 
(not interest in resources) shall be mentioned. The Antarctic only allows gen-
eral scientific research” (BArch 102/184071a IIIB3, 07/03/1978, 2).12 
In this diplomatic and political context, the Gondwana hypothesis was at 
stake in core documents leading to the German participation in the Antarctic 
Treaty System. In the addendum to the official address of the Minister for 
Science and Technology (“Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie,” 
BMFT) proposing to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt the German membership in 
the Antarctic Treaty System, the resource potential was supported by the 
Gondwana theory. 
The overall evaluation of Antarctic energy and mineral resources was based 
until recently especially on the Gondwanaland hypothesis. Antarctica consti-
tuted the central part of the former Gondwana continent, on which South 
America, South Africa, Madagascar, India and Australia directly abut. The re-
construction of the Gondwana continent was the basis for a simple, statistical, 
analogous calculation: the number of mineral deposits in South America, 
South Africa, Madagascar, India and Australia was correlated with the land-
mass of Antarctica. According to this calculation, theoretically almost as 
many mineral deposits should be found (BArch 102/184071b, 30/01/1978).13 
As the analysis of core diplomatic documents related to West German Antarc-
tic politics in the 1970s clearly shows, Germany wanted to become part of the 
Antarctic Treaty System in order to have the opportunity to gain access to 
living and nonliving resources. Political considerations and efforts were based 
on a close monitoring of the activities of the US and the Soviet Union. From a 
                                                             
12 „Gegenüber Drittstaaten soll ausschließlich auf ein allgemeines deutsches Forschungsinte-
resse (nicht Rohstoffinteresse) abgestellt werden. Der Antarktisvertrag sieht lediglich eine 
allgemeine wissenschaftliche Forschung vor.“ 
13 „Die Gesamteinschätzung der antarktischen Vorkommen an Energie- und mineralischen 
Rohstoffen stützte sich bis vor wenigen Jahren vor allem auf die Gondwanalandtheorie. Die 
Antarktis bildete den zentralen Teil des früheren Gondwana-Kontinents, an den Südamerika, 
Südafrika, Madagaskar, Indien und Australien direkt angrenzten. Die Rekonstruktion des 
Gondwana-Kontinents war Grundlage für eine simple statistische Analogierechnung: die 
Zahl der Rohstofflagerstätten in Südamerika, Südafrika, Madagaskar, Indien und Australien 
wurde auf die Landfläche der Antarktis umgerechnet. Danach müßten dort theoretisch na-
hezu ebenso viele Lagerstätten zu finden sein.“ 
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German perspective, there were signs that the two superpowers were moving 
into resource-oriented activities, and Germany did not want to miss the oppor-
tunity to participate (BArch 102/184068, 23/07/1975; 1, BArch B 102/184069, 
15/06/1976). In this context, the international cooperation with the USA played 
a crucial role at the beginning of Germany’s future geological Antarctic expe-
ditions. The leading Antarctic geologist of the BGR, Franz Tessensohn, partic-
ipated in 1977 in an American National Science Foundation-funded expedition 
to investigate uranium resources in Antarctica and thus enabled a crucial 
knowledge transfer from the US to Germany (BArch 102/184070, 11/08/1977). 
He then developed a major German Antarctic program for the BGR, starting in 
1979. The goal of these first geological expeditions was clear: Germany wanted 
to prove its scientific engagement and pave the way to becoming a consultative 
member of the Antarctic Treaty System. At that time this status was directly 
connected with the establishment of an Antarctic research station. In fact, the 
little “Lillie Marleen” hut erected for summer work in the North Victoria Land 
Mountains in 1979 was for the first (West German) Antarctic land expedition 
since 1938. 
In the following years, the BGR conducted systematic geological research in 
Antarctica. The North Victoria Land between the Ross Sea and the South Pa-
cific was chosen for long-term geological survey “because many important 
structure boundaries run through this area, including the gradation from the old 
East Antarctic shield to the younger West Antarctic Mobile Zone” (Knothe et 
al. 1981, 3). German geologists were interested in mapping this hitherto un-
known territory, in order to develop new plate tectonic models that could ex-
plain the formation of these mountains in relation to the history of Gondwana-
land: “Most of the geological problems in North Victoria Land concern 
structural questions of the Antarctic continent as a whole and of Gondwana-
land. This is one of the reasons why this target area was chosen for the expedi-
tion” (Tessensohn et al. 1981, 39). This basic research was related to the origin 
of oceans and continents and the fundamental geological structures of Antarcti-
ca. Nevertheless, economic and political strategies were the driving forces 
behind these expeditions, which experienced new dynamics and conflicts due 
to economic and environmental concerns. 
5.  A New Resource-Oriented Regime of the Antarctic 
Treaty System 
In the 1970s, questions of mineral exploitation and possible future environmen-
tal impact were on the agenda of the Antarctic Treaty meetings (Kissinger 
1975; ATS 1973, 1976, 1977; NSDM 1974; Ingersoll 1975; Wolfrum 1991, 4). 
These debates about living and nonliving resources in Antarctica indicate a 
major change in the Antarctic Treaty System regime: from a Cold War geo-
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physical approach to the resource-oriented agenda of the 1970s. In contrast to 
Cold War Arctic spaces, Antarctica was socially constructed as an antidote to 
Cold War spatialities, as a nuclear weapon-free, nonmilitary zone, where peaceful 
international cooperation supposedly prevailed over the secrecy of the Cold War 
(Korsmo 2010). Nevertheless, the predominant geophysical research questions of 
the IGY were related to the core issues of the Cold War. The military could use 
Antarctica as a laboratory to test material and men in extreme environmental 
conditions. The Antarctic research contributed to the scientific prestige of the 
two superpowers. Furthermore, the long-term measurements of ice, snow, 
wind, weather, and ocean currents were part of a global network that allowed 
the strategic monitoring of planet earth for scientific and military purposes.  
In the 1970s, Antarctica was perceived as a treasury providing oil, gas, food 
and water. These new resource-oriented geopolitical interests were directly 
related to difficult questions of sovereignty that were frozen by the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1961. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Antarctic Treaty System 
was under pressure, due to the global geopolitical dimension of economic and 
environmental concerns of Antarctic politics (Beck 1986, 5; Wolfrum 1984, 7). 
New geopolitical conflicts concerning future resource exploitation, environ-
mental protection and access of non-Western, “developing countries” to Ant-
arctica caused a crisis within the Antarctic Treaty System. It was not clear 
whether the Treaty group could maintain its framework vis-à-vis the idea of a 
“world park” professed by Greenpeace activists (Schmidt 1995, 17; Vorfel-der 
1987, 36-51; Joyner 1998, 174-9) or a UN regime (Wolfrum 1991, 81) favored 
by “developing countries” that did not rely any more on a major scientific 
contribution as the obligatory passage point and a precondition for Antarctic 
politics. The Antarctic Treaty members feared that the established and from 
their perspective well-functioning, but exclusive international regime of the 
Antarctic Treaty could be superseded by a new regime as was simultaneously 
discussed during the Law of the Sea Consultations in the 1970s. 
While issues of mineral exploration were not on the agenda of the meeting 
in Tokyo in 1970, the following Antarctic Treaty meetings explicitly addressed 
new tensions between environmental protection and mineral exploration. The 
reports of the seventh and eighth Antarctic Treaty consultations in 1972 in 
Wellington and in 1975 in Oslo show that possibilities and limits of mineral 
resource exploration began to be intensively discussed and recommendations 
for handling this problem were being prepared (ATS 1973, 1976). The repre-
sentatives in Oslo “resolved that the Consultative Parties should seek to devel-
op an approach to the problems raised by the possible presence of valuable 
mineral resources in the Antarctic Treaty Area, bearing in mind the principles 
of the Antarctic Treaty” (ATS 1976, 44). Consequently it was decided that the 
“Question of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation be placed on the Agenda of 
the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting” (ATS 1976). From these 
consultations it is evident that the Antarctic Treaty members felt the need to 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  215 
discuss possible environmental effects of future mineral exploitation. Antarctic 
scientists started to organize workshops, wrote papers to evaluate environmen-
tal consequences and tried to establish a convention on mineral resource ex-
ploitation (Zumberge 1979; Holdgate and Tinker 1979, 19). These assessments 
and scenarios were hypothetical, since there were no actual oil findings. Never-
theless, experts discussed the already concrete problems and consequences of 
future oil drillings. So at least the wish to drill in the near future must have 
been high at the time these consultations were taking place. Experts from the 
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research prepared a minerals agenda, which 
was ready to be signed at the end of the 1980s. But while the exploitation of 
living resources could be regulated by the establishment of the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in the 
early 1980s, the establishment of a mineral resource regime – the Convention 
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) – 
failed in 1988. These tensions and dynamics of the Antarctic Treaty System 
show that mineral resource exploitation really was a core issue of the Antarctic 
knowledge regime. Then, in 1990/1991, the environmental protocol of the 
Antarctic Treaty realized that a compromise had been “reached between pro-
mining and environmental interests, with the proposal of a fifty-year moratori-
um on mining exploration” (Elzinga 1993, 76). Yet the environmental protocol 
does not indicate the end of strategies for controlling or even extracting mineral 
resources in the future. This also holds true for the most important German 
player in resource-oriented research in Antarctica, the Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Resources, funded by the Ministry of Economics. The BGR is 
still interested in Antarctica’s mineral resource potential and therefore might 
develop strategies for environmentally friendly resource extraction that are in 
accordance with the Antarctic Treaty.  
6.  Conclusion 
Germany was a latecomer in the Antarctic Treaty System. Its engagement took 
place at a crucial time when conflicting global economic and environmental 
concerns were driving new actors to Antarctica. The German krill expeditions in 
1976 and 1978 as well as the geological GANOVEX expeditions starting in 1979 
show that a resource-oriented agenda and geopolitical interests motivated a major 
engagement in Antarctica. Scientific expertise and geological knowledge played 
a key role in this story. Scientific theories such as the new theory of plate tecton-
ics and new geological research triggered overly high expectations of future oil 
and mineral reserves. These were discussed and taken seriously by politicians, 
who decided to state-fund costly Antarctic expeditions and a long-term en-
gagement in Antarctic science. However, these expectations did not correspond 
with the rather skeptical scientific findings at the time. Bearing in mind that 
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there was no concrete evidence, at least no published and accessible proof of 
major oilfields, we have to conclude that political and geostrategic considera-
tions were the driving factors. In the 1970s, resource-oriented issues such as the 
oil crisis, the negotiations of the International Law of the Sea, the growing role of 
non-Western states and debates about the limits of growth determined the interna-
tional political agenda. Negotiations and assessments went as far as to seriously 
consider the possible environmental effects of oil drills in Antarctica. In this 
context, experts did not argue against future resource exploitation, but tried to 
find a reasonable middle way between commercial exploitation and the fragility 
of the Antarctic ecosystems. Thus, environmental concerns were part of a new 
knowledge regime that aimed at future resource exploration of Antarctica, 
which continues to be of global geostrategic interest up to the present day. 
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